|Lori L. Pelzer Lori L. Washington Sleeping with Judges Columbia, South Carolina |
|23rd of Jun, 2011 by User504514 |
|State of South Carolina County of Richland Glen K. LaConey (Assignee of Record) v. Home Assist Real Estate, LLC and Xavier Troy Smith, Judgment Roll No. 258732 In the matter of Lamar Advertising of Columbia, Inc. v. Home Assist Real Estate, LLC, (Home Assist) JR# 247286, Lamar Advertising (Lamar), represented by counsel, sought execution of its judgment before Judge Joseph M. Strickland, Master-in-Equity (Judge Strickland). During a hearing in early 2004, Judge Strickland ordered Lori Pelzer (Pelzer), officer of Home Assist, to make installment payments to Lamar, which Pelzer failed to pay. Judge Strickland issued his Order and Rule to Show Cause for Contempt against Pelzer. In response, Pelzer authored a letter to Judge Strickland, dated August 10, 2004, in which she stated that she was unable to comply with the courts order because she and her husband were financially distressed, and that she closed Home Assist in June 2004, during the proceeding. Judge Strickland dismissed the matter without prejudice. On December 16, 2004, Lori Pelzers husband, Melvin K. Pelzer, purchased a homestead valued at $261,167.00 on 216 Chalfont Lane in Richland County, South Carolina, as reflected in Deed Book R-1008, page 1467 in the Richland County Register of Deeds Office; and on December 16, 2004, Melvin Pelzer obtained a home equity loan valued at $52,223.00, secured by the Chalfont Lane property, as reflected in Deed Book R-1012, page 2314. Subsequently, Lori and Melvin opened Pelzer Premier Realty, a general partnership, in early 2005, after entry of the judgment below against Pelzer, and during the litigation in the instant matter, which resulted in judgment in the amount of $26,500.00. On November 7, 2005, the Court issued LaConeys proposed Order and Rule to Show Cause, directing Pelzer to appear as officer of Home Assist Real Estate, LLC, Respondent above-named, before Judge Strickland on December 7, 2005 for supplementary proceedings (debtor examination). Pelzer appeared and testified that the documents to be produced for examination were located at her attorneys office. LaConey demanded to examine the documents for the record. [Xavier Troy Smith, Respondent above-named, was not, and never has been, a party to the supplemental proceedings. Thus, the court had no post-judgment personal or subject-matter jurisdiction over Xavier Troy Smith.] Judge Strickland ordered Pelzer to appear again on January 5, 2006 to produce the documents. Pelzer failed to appear, purportedly due to surgery. Amazingly, during a hearing on February 13, 2006, Judge Strickland refused to compel Pelzer to produce the documents as ordered, then he dismissed the matter without prejudice. Mysteriously, Judge Stricklands written Order of Dismissal Without Prejudice, time-stamped as filed February 14, 2006, does not appear in the record. Pelzer dissolved Home Assist on February 14, 2006. (What a coincidence!) Amazingly, Judge Strickland, acting without jurisdiction and in his personal capacity, dismissed the matter with prejudice on January 7, 2008 without notice, without a hearing and without application by the parties. In his order with prejudice, Judge Strickland prevaricated that a hearing was held on July 16, 2007; however, no such hearing was held. Further, Judge Strickland omitted that he previously dismissed without prejudice. Thus, Judge Strickland denied LaConey due process of law and engaged in fraud on the court. Therefore, Judge Stricklands Order of Dismissal With Prejudice is void. [LaConey learned of the Order with Prejudice incidental to his complaint against Judge Strickland with the Judicial Merit Selection Commission in November 2008.] On April 5, 2010, LaConey filed his motion to vacate Judge Stricklands Order of Dismissal with Prejudice as void. To date, the motion has not been heard. Thus, LaConey has been denied the right to petition the court for redress of his grievances. On June 25, 2010, Judge James R. Barber, III, Chief Administrative Judge for the Court of Common Pleas, filed his Order, without notice, without affording LaConey an opportunity to respond in a meaningful way, and without certifying his familiarity with the record, in which he ruled that Because the dismissal was never appealed, Judge Stricklands ruling has become the law of the case.. Judge Barber omitted that LaConey had sought relief from the judgment by his motion to vacate. Apparently, Judge Barber failed to review the record in an effort to ignore the numerous affidavits filed by LaConey alleging that Judge Strickland had aided and abetted Pelzer in hindering, delaying and defrauding LaConey in the execution of his judgment, and obstructed the administration of justice. No Petition and Order of Reference to the Master-in-Equity, conferring jurisdiction upon the Master, appear in the record. Therefore, both Judge Strickland and Judge Barber should have known, had they reviewed the record, that they lacked jurisdiction to issue any orders in this case. [Judge Barbers order, based on Judge Stricklands order, is void.] Judge Barbers term as Chief Administrative Judge expired on June 31, 2010. On July 2, 2010, LaConey sent his letter, with attachments, to Judge Alison Renee Lee, Chief Administrative Judge for the Court of Common Pleas, advising Judge Lee of the status of the case and seeking supplementary proceedings in aid of judgment. Judge Lee responded with her letter, dated July 15, 2010, in which she advised that she was in the process of reviewing the record in the case for any appropriate action, that LaConey was not listed as a party of record in the case, had requested the Clerk of Court to correct the record, and that she had requested all relevant materials pertaining to the case from Judge Stricklands office. To date, Judge Lee has taken no action; thereby, frustrating and impeding execution of LaConey?s judgment. Glen K. LaConey (Assignee of Record) v. Lori Pelzer, Judgment Roll No. 247572 On June 4, 2007, Lori Pelzer, Respondent above-named, was served through her counsel, Derwin T. Brannon, Esq., with the courts order and Rule to Show Cause for Supplementary Proceedings, which included a restraining order against the transfer, interference with or disposal of Pelzers property pending further direction of the court. However, on June 7, 2007, Pelzer restructured Pelzer Premier Realty as Pelzer Premier Realty, LLC, thereby encumbering her partnership interests in the business. (Derwin T. Brannon, Esq. got BUSTED, and lost his law license!) During supplementary proceedings, held before Judge Strickland on July 16, 2007, Pelzer yelled in open court, Im not payin Mr. LaConey a dime! Im READY to go to jail! Im READY to go to jail!, after which Judge Strickland dismissed the matter without prejudice. [July 16, 2007 was referenced in above case.] On July 16, 2008, Judge L. Casey Manning filed LaConeys proposed Order and Rule to Show Cause for Supplementary Proceedings. The matter was not set for hearing. On May 1, 2009, LaConey filed his motion for disqualification of Judge Strickland. Judge Strickland filed his Order of Recusal on May 5, 2009. On August 6, 2009, Judge James R. Barber, III, Chief Administrative Judge for the Court of Common Pleas, filed LaConeys proposed Order and Rule to Show Cause and set the matter for hearing before Judge G. Thomas Cooper, Jr. on September 23, 2009. Pelzer failed to appear. During the hearing, Judge Cooper directed LaConey to surrender the certified mail delivery receipt, evidencing service upon Pelzer, to Judge Cooper for filing. The delivery receipt has mysteriously disappeared! On April 22, 2010, LaConey filed his motion for supplementary proceedings which was delivered to Judge Cooper via certified mail, return receipt requested. The motion cited numerous incidents of fraudulent conveyances and violations of the Courts restraining order by Pelzer. Judge Cooper disregarded the motion, failed to certify his familiarity with the record, failed to take any action, and failed to issue his final order. Thus, the matter remains pending before Judge Cooper. On June 25, 2010, Judge James R. Barber, III, Chief Administrative Judge for the Court of Common Pleas, filed his Order, without notice, without affording LaConey an opportunity to respond in a meaningful way, and without certifying his familiarity with the record, in which he ruled that This Court has advised Mr. LaConey that it will not be scheduling Supplemental Proceedings, a function generally performed by the Master-in-Equity. Mr. LaConey may proceed with Supplemental Proceedings in the Pelzer case, but only through the appointment of a Special Referee. Apparently, Judge Barber failed to review the record in the case in an effort to ignore the numerous affidavits filed by LaConey, which alleged that Judge Strickland had aided and abetted Lori Pelzer in hindering, delaying and defrauding LaConey in the execution of his judgments and had obstructed the administration of justice. Otherwise, Judge Barber would have known that he had previously assigned the matter to a circuit court judge; which is not that, This Court has advised Mr. LaConey that it will not be scheduling Supplemental Proceedings. Judge Barber lacked authority to issue final order in the matter, on the basis that Judge Cooper, not Judge Barber, was the assigned judge with authority to issue a final order. Judge Barber persistently issued orders in these cases without jurisdiction, and without service upon LaConey. The offending orders were issued without notice, without affording LaConey an opportunity to respond in a meaningful way, and without Judge Barbers certification of familiarity with the record. On July 2, 2010, LaConey sent his letter, with attachments, to Judge Alison Renee Lee, Chief Administrative Judge for the Court of Common Pleas, advising Judge Lee of the status of these cases and seeking supplementary proceedings in aid of his judgments. Judge Lee responded with her letter, dated July 15, 2010, in which she advised that she was in the process of reviewing the record in the case for any appropriate action, that LaConey was not listed as a party of record in the case, had requested the Clerk of Court to correct the record, and that she had requested all relevant materials pertaining to the case from Judge Stricklands office. On December 21, 2011, LaConey sent his request and proposed Order of Reference for appointment of a Special Referee to Judge Lee via first-class mail. On April 1, 2011, LaConey filed his Motion for Disqualification of Judge Alison Renee Lee. To date, Judge Lee has taken no action. Lori Pelzer had planned to debut PINKK Realty Co. to transfer her assets again in defraud of her numerous judgment creditors. Go Pinkk. Now the broke-down Lori Pelzer is working as a broker for Keller Williams Realty. Lori Pelzer has more judgments entered against her than the law allows. Check the Circuit and Summary Court records for "Lori Pelzer" - then check Lori Pelzers critically acclaimed "accolades"! Lori Pelzer is a Beauty Queen with an uncanny ability to influence judges in her favor and make them fall in love with her! It appears that even Circuit Court Judge Alison Renee Lee is enamored with Lori. Why? Perhaps Lori Pelzer should write a book entitled, Sleeping with the Judges!. Source: http://loripelzer.blogspot.com/2011/02/sleeping-with-judges.html|
|South Carolina JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT |
PLEASE READ all about the guy who's been planting lies about me & my company
This is the woman that has been attacked by these vicious statements of people being ripped off by me and my realestate company defrauded creditors. This guy has been sited in SC or acting like an attorney on other occasions. He has been operating in false position pretending to be a company DBA as "Refunds Plus". He goes about buying old court matters with other parties involved and began to take them to court which he attempted to do to me and my company and lost time after time. I hired an atty Derwain Brannon esq and he began to threaten us all with jail, and wrath of GOD... this guy is dangerous and very vicious with his @ years of letters to my home as well postings all over the internet search engines. He uses Facebook and contacts me through any social media I start and contacts others I know and other attempts to scare me and my family. I owe him nothing and the matter in his so called articles Lori Pelzer sleeping with judges and defrauds creditors is FALSE. My hope is to see him punished for his acts and lies to make others think he is a consumer and so on.. he out to hurt my reputation and enough is enough! I m fighting back.. Please read all about your mystery HIT MAN AKA Glenn Laconey
26376 - Roberts v. LaConey
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Supreme Court
Eddie Roberts, Petitioner,
Glen LaConey, d/b/a Refunds Plus, Respondent.
Opinion No. 26376
Submitted August 14, 2007 – Filed September 4, 2007
IN THE ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
Harry Clayton DePew, Law Office of Harry DePew, of Columbia, for Petitioner.
Glen K. LaConey, Refunds Plus, of Columbia, for Respondent.
H. Clayton Walker, Jr., and Robert L. Reibold, of Walker & Reibold, of Columbia, for Bridgewood Homes, Inc., Amicus Curiae.
PER CURIAM: We accepted this declaratory judgment matter in our original jurisdiction, pursuant to In re Unauthorized Practice of Law Rules Proposed by the South Carolina Bar, 309 S.C. 304, 422 S.E.2d 123 (1992), to determine if respondent has engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. We also granted a motion for leave to file an amicus brief filed by Bridgewood Homes, Inc. The matter was referred to a Special Referee, by order dated May 17, 2005, to take evidence and issue a report containing proposed findings of fact and recommendations to the Court.
The Special Referee issued a Report of Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law recommending this Court find respondent engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. Thereafter, respondent was the only party to file exceptions to the Report. A schedule for serving and filing the briefs and record in this matter was established. However, respondent failed to serve and file a record or brief as instructed.
Rule 208(a)(4), SCACR, states that if an appellant fails to file a brief, the appeal will be dismissed. Because respondent is the party objecting to the Special Referee’s report by way of exceptions, and was instructed to serve and file the record and a brief addressing the exceptions, he is in the posture of an appellant. Accordingly, because he has failed to file a brief in the matter, we hereby dismiss his exceptions and, because we agree that respondent has engaged in the unauthorized practice of law, we adopt the following Report of the Special Referee as the opinion of this Court.
SPECIAL REFEREE’S REPORT OF PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
This case was filed in the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of South Carolina. The Court appointed me as a special referee to take evidence and issue a report containing proposed findings of fact and recommendations concerning Petitioner’s allegations that the Respondent has engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.
I. Petitioner’s Allegations
The allegations turn on a document titled “Notice of Assignment and Assignment of Judgment, ” which Petitioner contends is essentially a contingency fee agreement for legal services, in which Respondent agreed to attempt to collect a judgment in exchange for a fee of approximately one-third. Petitioner contends that, under the terms of this agreement, Respondent engaged in the unauthorized practice of law in attempting to collect the judgment.
II. Proposed Findings of Fact
On January 3, 1996, Paul W. Nickoson obtained a judgment in the amount of $7587.67 against Eddie Roberts, d/b/a Eddie Roberts Auto Service. Respondent approached Nickoson about attempting to collect this judgment. On August 17, 2004, Nickoson and Respondent executed a document entitled “Notice of Assignment and Assignment of Judgment.” The document provides in important part:
I, Paul W. Nickoson, Judgment Creditor in the above entitled actions, (hereinafter “Assignor”), do hereby transfer, assign and setover the Judgment rendered to me in this action to REFUNDS PLUS . . . (hereinafter “Assignee”) in exchange for a retention of a (66.6%) interest in the amount recovered by Assignee.
Assignee, it’s agents, assigns and successors shall have full authority to settle, compromise and enforce said Judgment, and Assignor withdraws all right to same.
(Reference to exhibits omitted).
On August 27, 2004, Respondent began the process of execution of the judgment by having the Richland County Clerk of Court command the Sheriff of Richland County to satisfy the judgment out of the personal or real property of Roberts. . . . Respondent signed the Execution Against Property as “Plaintiff’s Attorneys.”
On September 2, 2004, Respondent wrote a letter to Roberts explaining that he was going to begin efforts to collect the judgment that he claimed had been “assigned” to him. (Reference to exhibit omitted). In this letter, Respondent explains the manner in which he planned to collect the judgment, including the manner in which he planned to use the judicial process. Specifically, Respondent stated his intention to file an action in the “Master-in-Equity Court to Order you to appear with your . . . financial records . . . and testify under oath . . . .” Respondent offered several legal opinions in the letter, including that a corporation Roberts apparently owned “would be held jointly and severably liable for this debt.” He also made several threats about consequences Roberts would face if he did not cooperate and willingly satisfy the judgment.
On September 17, 2004, Respondent served “Plaintiff’s Request for Production of Documents” on Roberts, with an attached “Exhibit A” listing seventeen categories of documents Roberts was required to produce. (Reference to exhibit omitted). Respondent amended the Request for Production on September 18, 2004. (Reference to exhibit omitted). On September 29, 2004, Respondent again wrote Roberts making additional threats about how he would use the judicial process and the consequences Roberts would face if he did not pay the judgment. (Reference to exhibit omitted).
On February 8, 2005, Respondent filed a “Notice of Motion and Motion for Supplementary Proceedings.” (Reference to exhibit omitted). This motion resulted in an “Order of Reference and Rule to Show Cause” signed on February 15, requiring Roberts to attend a hearing and bring all his financial records. The Honorable Joseph Strickland, Master in Equity for Richland County, held a hearing sometime later and Respondent personally appeared as the representative of the judgment holder. Finally, on February 28, 2005, Respondent wrote Roberts again threatening consequences of not claiming mail sent to Roberts, and threatening to “have you ARRESTED and brought to court in restraints the way Moses was brought before Pharoah in the movie, ‘The Ten commandments.’”
III. Applicable Law
“The generally understood definition of the practice of law embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, and the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts.” Brown v. Coe, 365 S.C. 137, 139, 616 S.E.2d 705, 706-07 (2005)(citing Doe v. McMaster, 355 S.C. 306, 311, 585 S.E.2d 773, 775-77 (2003); State v. Despain, 319 S.C. 317, 319 460 S.E.2d 576, 577 (1995); In re Duncan, 83 S.C. 186, 189, 65 S.E. 210, 211 (1909)). “The practice of law ‘is not confined to litigation, but extends to activities in other fields which entail specialized legal knowledge and ability.’” Linder v. Insurance Claims Consultants, Inc., 348 S.C. 477, 487, 560 S.E.2d 612, 617 (2002) (quoting State v. Buyers Services Co., Inc., 292 S.C. 426, 430, 357 S.E.2d 15, 17 (1987)). Other than these general statements, there is no comprehensive definition of the practice of law. See Linder, 348 S.C. at 487, 560 S.E.2d at 617-18. Rather, what constitutes the practice of law must be decided on the facts and in the context of each individual case.
IV. Proposed Conclusions of Law
The “Notice of Assignment and Assignment of Judgment” is not an assignment of the judgment as it purports to be. The original judgment holder retained an ownership interest in the judgment. Respondent gained an interest that had value only on the successful collection of some portion of it. Respondent paid nothing for the interest he acquired. He was to be paid, if at all, only when the judgment was collected. The practical effect of their agreement is that Respondent was to be paid a fee to collect the debt. Therefore, the supposed “assignee, ” Respondent, was not acting entirely on his own behalf, but on behalf of the original judgment holder. Respondent could not have been practicing law if he had been acting on his own behalf under a true assignment. However, because he was acting on behalf of the original judgment holder, his actions must be examined to determine whether they constitute the practice of law.
Respondent did many things on behalf of the judgment holder in the collection of this debt that meet the general definition of the practice of law. He prepared “pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings.” See Brown, 365 S.C. at 139, 616 S.E.2d at 706-07. These include “Plaintiff’s Request for Production of Documents, ” the “Notice of Motion and Motion for Supplementary Proceedings, ” and the “Execution Against Judgment.”
Respondent also managed the collection action “on behalf of [the judgment holder] before judges and courts.” See Id. For example, Respondent prepared “Execution Against Judgment” and had it signed by the Clerk of the Circuit Court directing the Sheriff to satisfy the judgment. His “management” activities also include serving the Request for Production on Roberts, and filing the Motion he prepared in the Equity Division of the Circuit Court. He used the “Motion” to obtain an “Order of Reference and Rule to Show Cause.” Most importantly, he appeared at a hearing before the Equity Division on behalf of the judgment holder.
In addition, Respondent developed a strategy to use in collecting the debt for Nickoson. In furtherance of this strategy, he sent letters to Roberts that were designed to induce him to pay the judgment. Some of these letters contained legal opinions formulated by Respondent. This is the type of strategic activity which the Supreme Court referred to in Linder as entailing “specialized legal knowledge and ability.” 348 S.C. at 487, 560 S.E.2d at 617.
Finally, in determining whether someone is practicing law, it is important to consider representations the person makes about his own activity. As mentioned above, Respondent represented on the signature line of the “Execution Against Judgment” that he was acting as “Plaintiff’s Attorneys.” Despite the fact that this language appears to be part of the printed form Respondent was using, by signing the form as he did, Respondent made a public statement as to the role he was playing in collecting the judgment. The use of this language in a document being served on a judgment debtor is reasonably understood to increase the chances of collecting the debt.
Other states have considered whether similar activity constitutes the unauthorized practice of law. In Iowa Supreme Court Comm’n on Unauthorized Practice of Law v. A-1 Assocs, Ltd., 623 N.W.2d 803 (2001), the Supreme Court of Iowa concluded that an instrument similar to the “Notice of Assignment and Assignment of Judgment” used by Respondent was not in fact an assignment of a judgment, but was an agreement for collection services such as a lawyer would perform. The court noted that if the instrument truly had been an assignment, then the assignee could have attempted to collect the judgment without engaging in the practice of law. The court went on to state “A-1’s claimed status as a bona fide assignee is defeated under this record, however, because the assignment – though absolute in form – is, in fact, a transfer intended primarily to secure payment for services rendered. (citation omitted). This is demonstrated by the fact that A-1 pays nothing for the purported ‘assignment.’ . . . Courts throughout the country have condemned this practice as an attempt by collection agencies to accomplish indirectly what the law otherwise prohibits.” (citation omitted). 623 N.W.2d at 808. The court concluded that A-1 Associated, Ltd. had engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. “So long as A-1 is not representing its own legal interests . . ., but the legal interests of others, it is engaging – without license or other authorization – in the practice of law.” 623 N.W.2d at 808-09.
In State ex rel. State Bar of Wisconsin v. Bonded Collections, Inc., 36 Wis.2d 643, 154 N.W.2d 250 (1967),  the Supreme Court of Wisconsin considered the following issue: “Does a course of conduct whereby a collection agency takes assignments of accounts for collection, . . ., brings suit in its own name, and then pursuant to a prior agreement deducts from the proceeds, costs, and a fixed percentage as its fee and remits the balance to the creditor, constitute the unauthorized practice of law?” 154 N.W.2d at 253-54. In concluding that it does, the court stated “[i]t is sheer hypocrisy to conclude that the percentage retained by the collection agency represents its equity or ownership share of the claim. It is its fee or charge for professional services rendered.” 154 N.W.2d at 256. The Wisconsin court also noted that “[t]he collection agency by going into court representing itself as the client perpetrates a fraud on the court.” Id.
See also State ex rel. Norvell v. Credit Bureau of Albuquerque, Inc., 85 N.M. 521, 514 P.2d 40, 49 (1973) (assignments procured by credit bureau not truly taken to acquire title and ownership but to facilitate delivery of legal services for consideration constitute unauthorized practice of law); State ex rel. Frieson v. Isner, 168 W.Va.758, 285 S.E.2d 641, 651-52 (1981) (citing numerous cases to support conclusion that assignment taken solely to maintain suit on creditor’s claim is sham perpetrated on court to enable unauthorized practice of law).
Based on the foregoing, we conclude respondent’s actions, as outlined in this matter, constitute the unauthorized practice of law.
TOAL, C.J., MOORE, WALLER, BURNETT and PLEICONES, JJ., concur.
 It was not possible for the Special Referee to determine the precise manner in which Respondent solicited the opportunity to collect this judgment, because Respondent chose not to show up for the hearing. However, it is clear from the evidence that was presented that respondent solicited the business of collecting this and other judgments. This evidence includes the fact that Respondent operated under the business name of Refunds Plus.
 Many of these threats are entirely inappropriate, and would violate the Rules of Professional Conduct if made by a lawyer. However, this aspect of Respondent’s conduct is not before me.
 In this case, the collection agency actually hired a lawyer to represent it in court. The basis of the court’s decision, however, was that the collection agency was practicing law by representing the creditor, and the fact that the agency hired a lawyer to do so did not change that.
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